. In the end, the plans were shelved, but only after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine.
Of course, one of the issues was seemingly unavoidable: It didn’t take into account any disruption outside of Europe. “It covers everything that is internal,” says Gladkykh. “It doesn’t cover all the external factors that are sometimes unpredictable.” That includes an illegal invasion by Russia of a sovereign country, Ukraine, and the resulting backlash and economic sanctions that war sets off. “Germany, particularly, was pushing this idea that trade will encourage change in Russia]” she says.
Part of the issue with the internal European market in energy ensuring security of supply is that it forecasted a quicker shift toward renewables than has happened in reality. “There was chronic underinvestment and the capacity installment was just too slow,” she says. Gladkykh, who worked for Ukraine’s government when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in 2014, isn’t sure whether any market structure would have insulated Europe from the external shocks that the past six months have created. But the market structure we have means that countries already facing their own critical supply shortages are forced to let gas pass them by so that it travels farther down the supply chain, even if they desperately need it themselves.
It is not clear whether this charitable approach will survive the coming difficult winter. Germany’s predicament is an example of “bad decision-making, basically,” says Gladkykh, but they’re not alone. The chill is coming for all European countries, and the idea that countries are all in this together may dissipate when the going gets tough.